



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

respect the book is in line with—although acutely critical of—all the more significant modern developments in politics. For the philosopher of the new politics this volume is rich in suggestion.

H. A. OVERSTREET.

COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.

Mind and Conduct. HENRY RUTGERS MARSHALL. Morse Lectures delivered at the Union Theological Seminary in 1919. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1919. Pp. ix + 236.

Under this title Dr. Marshall presents a discussion of several traditional problems in psychological ethics, showing throughout the work a disposition toward original speculation on a basis of recent science, rather than the gathering of accepted facts in text-book form. Much of the actual newness of the book consists however in its terminology rather than its conclusions, which after glances at instinct-feelings, neururgic and noetic patterns, guide the reader back to the firm ground of psychophysical parallelism, the dignity and freedom of man, the value of intelligence, and the right to believe.

Implied in the title of Part I., "The Correlation of Mind and Conduct," is an hypothesis stated on page 10, "that consciousness and behavior are two diverse and distinct existences, and that they are in some manner related." Later (p. 26) this receives more explicit formulation: "(1) Each situation in consciousness involves a special and specific mode of behavior. (2) Each mode of human conduct has correspondent with it a special and specific situation in consciousness. (3) The noetic and neururgic correspondence appears to be thoroughgoing." Much of the remainder of the work is in some sense a following out of the implications of this assumed correspondence, upon the principle that if a certain phenomenon is observed on one plane, it must have its counterpart on the other, even though the distinct existence of that counterpart is otherwise undiscoverable. In quest (p. 29) of something in behavior to correspond with reason, we find "adaptive acts," while "turning to the psychic field we are led to the suggestion that we should find what we may call 'instinct-feelings' corresponding with our instinct-actions . . . even though these instinct-feelings are often so unemphatic as to escape our notice." By this method, reminiscent of Mendeleëff's hypothesis that certain elements must exist because there is a place in the periodic table for them, we are led to a concept of the Self as a psychic complex analogous to the bodily organism, with an attendant doctrine of the "empirical ego" that appears in self-consciousness.

There follows an incursion into metaphysics: we have a sense of the Self's creativeness, so there must also be in the field of behavior an objective creativeness. Since Man is a part of Nature and creativeness is one of his characteristics, it must also be a characteristic of Nature. The opposing doctrine of mechanism is stated in terms that may perhaps arouse protest from its adherents, especially where the mechanist is made to assume (p. 84) "that at one moment at least in the history of the Universe objective creativeness appeared; for he tells us that at some indefinite time in the past this huge clock-like machine was wound up." Newness or creative spontaneity in Nature, not clearly defined but illustrated by the biological discoveries of De Vries and T. H. Morgan, is in Dr. Marshall's concept an ever-present determining, though apparently undetermined, factor in the world process. It is held to be different from the entelechy of the vitalists in that it "always has been, and now is, operative through the whole of Nature."

This concept provides a basis for stressing the importance of creative ideals, and the freedom of the Self "to act in accord with its own nature." One of the most interesting sections of the book deals with the matter, always debatable in law, psychology, and ethics, of responsibility for one's actions. Here the position adopted is the radical one that there is no such thing as irresponsibility, even in insanity; the determination of guilt and punishment is a distinct and irrelevant problem. Under the heading "Guides to Conduct," pleasure and pain, happiness, intuition and reason are in turn examined and found only partially helpful. Psychological hedonism is rejected in the usual manner for its falsity, and ethical hedonism for its impracticality. Intuition, viewed in no mystical sense but as an immediate instinctive or habitual reaction, is recognized in conclusion as having its own value, even against reason.

The scope of Dr. Marshall's work as a guide to contemporary psychological ethics is somewhat restricted by an almost total absence of the social viewpoint, which many have come to consider indispensable to a study in this field. To readers already convinced of its premises it will be especially welcome for its treatment of them in terms of recent science, while to others, by reason of a frequent reliance upon deduction at the expense of evidence, the first two parts may seem an unconvincing though a clear and thoughtful statement of opposing views. The discussion of guides to conduct is less polemical, more concrete and practical, and deserves therefore a more undisputed place as a serious contribution to the technique of intelligent conduct.

THOMAS MUNRO.